For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that the informed player's reputation is private.
Introduction
Reputation games capture settings in which a long-lived player bene…ts from the perception that her characteristics may be di¤erent than they actually are. Reputation e¤ects arise most cleanly when a long-lived player faces a sequence of short-lived players who believe the long-lived player might be committed to the stage-game "Stackelberg" action. In such a setting, the Stackelberg payo¤ provides a lower bound on the long-lived player's average payo¤, provided she is su¢ ciently patient (Fudenberg and Levine (1989) , Fudenberg and Levine (1992) ). In an earlier paper (Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) ), we showed that if monitoring is imperfect and the reputation of the long-lived player is public, meaning that the public signals allow the long-lived player to infer the short-lived players'beliefs about the long-lived player's type, then reputation e¤ects disappear. Almost surely, the short-lived player eventually learns the type of the long-lived player.
Many long-run relationships involve two (or more) long-lived players. Reputation e¤ects arise in this setting as well, and can be more powerful than when the uninformed player is short-lived. Intertemporal incentives can induce the uninformed agent to choose actions even more advantageous to the informed long-lived player than the myopic best reply to the Stackelberg action (Celentani, Fudenberg, Levine, and Pesendorfer (1996) ).
In this paper, we show that reputations also disappear when the uninformed player is long-lived. 1 When considering long-lived uninformed players, it is natural for the analysis to encompass private reputations: the actions of both players are not only imperfectly monitored, but the monitoring need not have the special structure required for the informed player to infer the uninformed player's beliefs. Instead, the uninformed player's beliefs depend critically on her own past actions, which the informed player cannot observe. 2 In our analysis, the long-lived informed player (player 1) may be a commitment type that plays an exogenously speci…ed strategy or a normal type that maximizes expected payo¤s. We show that if the commitment strategy is not an equilibrium strategy for the normal type in the 1 Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, Theorem 6 ) is a partial result for the case of a long-lived uninformed player whose beliefs are public. That result is unsatisfactory in that it imposes a condition on the behavior of the long-lived uninformed player in equilibrium. See footnote 4 for more details.
2 For example, the inferences a …rm draws from market prices may depend upon the …rm's output choices, which others do not observe. Because private reputations arise when the uninformed player observes his own past actions, they occur most naturally with a single, long-lived uninformed player rather than a sequence of short-lived players. complete-information game, then in any Nash equilibrium of the incompleteinformation repeated game, almost surely the uninformed player (player 2) will learn that a normal long-lived player is indeed normal. Thus, a longlived player cannot inde…nitely maintain a reputation for behavior that is not credible given her type.
Establishig such a result for the case of public reputations and shortlived uninformed players is relatively straightforward (Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) ). Since monitoring is imperfect, deviations from equilibrium play by player 1 cannot be unambiguously detected by player 2, precluding the trigger-strategy equilibria that support permanent reputations in perfect-monitoring games. Instead, the long-run convergence of beliefs ensures that eventually any current signal of play has an arbitrarily small e¤ect on player 2's beliefs. When reputations are public, player 1 eventually knows that player 1's beliefs have nearly converged and hence that playing di¤erently from the commitment strategy will incur virtually no cost in terms of altered beliefs. But the long-run e¤ect of many such deviations from the commitment strategy would be to drive the equilibrium to full revelation. Public reputations can thus be maintained only in the absence of incentives to indulge in such deviations, that is, only if the reputation is for behavior that is part of an equilibrium of the complete-information game corresponding to the long-lived player's type.
The situation is more complicated in the private-reputation case, where player 2's beliefs are not known by player 1. Now, player 1 may not know when deviations from the commitment strategy have relatively little e¤ect on beliefs and hence are relatively costless. Making the leap from the preceding intuition to our main result thus requires showing that there is a set of histories under which player 2's beliefs have nearly converged, and that player 1 is eventually relatively certain player 2 has such beliefs.
In general, one cannot expect player 1's beliefs about player 2's beliefs to be very accurate when the latter depend on private histories. A key step in our proof is to show that whenever player 2's private history induces him to act as if he is convinced of some important characteristic of player 1, eventually player 1 must become convinced that such a private history did indeed occur. In particular, if this private history ensured that player 2 is almost convinced that he faces a commitment type, and acts on this belief, then this eventually becomes known to player 1.
As in the case where player 1's reputation is public, the impermanence of reputation also arises at the behavioral level. Asymptotically, continuation play in every Nash equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium of the completeinformation game.
For expositional clarity, this paper considers a long-lived informed player who can be one of two possible types-a commitment and a normal typefacing a single long-lived uninformed player, in a game of imperfect public monitoring. The argument of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, Section 6 .1) can be used to extend our results to many possible commitment types. The …nal section of this paper explains how our results can be extended to the case of private monitoring (where reputations are necessarily private).
Our analysis subsumes a private-reputation model with a sequence of short-lived uninformed players. In several places, the arguments for the latter case are simpler and considerably more revealing, primarily because we can then restrict attention to simpler commitment strategies. Accordingly, where appropriate, we give the simpler argument for short-lived uninformed players as well as the more involved argument for the long-lived uninformed player.
The Complete-Information Game
We begin with an in…nitely repeated game with imperfect public monitoring. The stage game is a two-player simultaneous-move …nite game of public monitoring. Player 1 chooses an action i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig I and player 2 chooses an action j 2 f1; 2; :::; Jg J. The public signal, y, is drawn from the …nite set Y . The probability that y is realized under the action pro…le (i; j) is given by y ij . The ex post stage-game payo¤ to player 1 (respectively, 2) from the action i (resp., j) and signal y is given by f 1 (i; y) (resp., f 2 (j; y)). The ex ante stage game payo¤s are 1 (i; j) = P y f 1 (i; y) y ij and 2 (i; j) = P y f 2 (j; y) y ij . We assume the public signals have full support (Assumption 1), so every signal y is possible after any action pro…le. We also assume that with suf…ciently many observations, either player can correctly identify, from the frequencies of the signals, any …xed stage-game action of their opponent (Assumptions 2 and 3).
Assumption 2 (Identification of 1) For all j 2 J, the I columns in the matrix ( y ij ) y2Y;i2I are linearly independent.
Assumption 3 (Identification of 2) For all i 2 I, the J columns in the matrix ( y ij ) y2Y;j2J are linearly independent.
The stage game is in…nitely repeated. Player 1 ("she") is a long-lived player with discount factor 1 < 1. Player 2 ("he") is either short-lived, in which case a new player 2 appears in each period, or is also long-lived, in which case player 2's discount factor 2 may di¤er from 1 . Each player observes the realizations of the public signal and his or her own past actions. (If player 2 is short-lived, he observes the actions chosen by the previous player 2's). Player 1 in period t thus has a private history, consisting of the public signals and her own past actions, denoted by h 1t ((i 0 ; y 0 ); (i 1 ; y 1 ); : : : ; (i t 1 ; y t 1 )) 2 H 1t (I Y ) t . Similarly, a private history for player 2 is denoted h 2t ((j 0 ; y 0 ); (j 1 ; y 1 ); : : : ; (j t 1 ; y t 1 )) 2 H 2t (J Y ) t . The public history observed by both players is the sequence (y 0 ; y 1 ; : : : ; y t 1 ) 2 Y t . The …ltration on (I J Y ) 1 induced by the private histories of player = 1; 2 is denoted fH`tg 1 t=0 , while the …ltration induced by the public histories (y 0 ; y 1 ; :::; y t 1 ) is denoted fH t g 1 t=0 . In Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) , we assumed that the public signal included player 2's action. This ensures that player 1 knows everything player 2 does, including player 2's beliefs. Here, only player 2 observes his action, breaking the link between 2's beliefs and 1's beliefs about those beliefs.
The long-lived players' payo¤s in the in…nite horizon game are the averaged discounted sum of stage-game payo¤s, (1 `) P 1 =0 ` `( i ; j ) for = 1; 2. The random variable `t denotes average discounted payo¤s in period t,
If player 2 is short-lived, the period-t player 2 has payo¤s 2 (i t ; j t ).
A behavior strategy for player 1 (respectively, 2) is a map, 1 :
, from all private histories to the set of distributions over current actions. For`= 1; 2, `d e…nes a sequence of functions f `t g 1 t=0 with 1t : H 1t ! I and 2t : H 2t ! J . Each function `t denotes the t th period behavior strategy of `. The strategy pro…le = ( 1 ; 2 ) induces a probability distribution P over (I J Y ) 1 . Let E [ j H`t] denote player`'s expectations with respect to this distribution conditional on H`t.
A Nash equilibrium for the case of two long-lived players requires player 's strategy to maximize the expected value of `0 , the discounted value of payo¤s in period zero:
De…nition 1 A Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game with a long-lived player 2 is a strategy pro…le = ( 1 ; 2 ) such that
This requires that under the equilibrium pro…le, player`'s strategy maximizes continuation expected utility after any positive-probability history. For example, for player 1,
1 and all t. The assumption of full-support monitoring ensures that all histories of public signals occur with positive probability, and hence must be followed by optimal behavior in any Nash equilibrium (with long-lived or short-lived player 2's, and complete or incomplete information). Consequently, any Nash equilibrium outcome is also the outcome of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
For future reference, when player 2 is long-lived,
is the set of player 2's best replies to 1 in the game with complete information. When player 2 is short-lived, in equilibrium, player 2 plays a best response after every equilibrium history. Player 2's strategy 2 is then a best response to 1 if, for all t,
Denote the set of such best responses by BR S ( 1 ). The de…nition of a Nash equilibrium for this case is:
De…nition 2 A Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game with a short-lived player 2 is a strategy pro…le = ( 1 ; 2 ) such that
[ 10 ] for all 0 1 and 2 2 BR S ( 1 ).
3 The Incomplete-Information Game: Disappearing Reputations
We now perturb the complete-information game by introducing incomplete information about the type of player 1. At time t = 1, Nature selects a type of player 1. With probability 1 p 0 > 0, she is the "normal" type, denoted by n and with the preferences described above, who plays a repeated game strategy~ 1 . With probability p 0 > 0, she is a "commitment" type, denoted by c, who plays the repeated game strategy^ 1 .
A state of the world in the incomplete information game, !, is a type for player 1 and sequence of actions and signals. The set of states is fn; cg (I J Y )
1 . The prior p 0 , the commitment strategy^ 1 , and the strategy pro…le~ = (~ 1 ; 2 ), jointly induce a probability measure P on , which describes how an uninformed player expects play to evolve. The strategy pro…le^ = (^ 1 ; 2 ) (respectively,~ = (~ 1 ; 2 )) determines a probability measureP (resp.,P ) on , which describes how play evolves when player 1 is the commitment (resp., normal) type. SinceP andP are absolutely continuous with respect to P , any statement that holds Palmost surely, also holdsP -andP -almost surely. We use E (~ 1 ;^ 1 ; 2 ) [ ] to denote expectations taken with respect to the measure P . This will usually be abbreviated to E[ ] except where it is important to emphasize the dependence on the strategies. Also, where appropriate, we useẼ[ ] and E[ ] to denote the expectations taken with respect toP andP instead of
The …ltrations fH`tg 1 t=0 and fH t g 1 t=0 will be viewed as …ltrations on in the obvious way.
The normal type of player 1 has the same objective function as in the complete-information game. Player 2, on the other hand, uses the information he has acquired from his time t private history to update his beliefs about player 1's type and actions, and then maximizes expected payo¤s. Player 2's posterior belief in period t that player 1 is the commitment type is the H 2t -measurable random variable P (cjH 2t ) p t : ! [0; 1]. By Assumption 1, Bayes' rule determines this posterior after all histories. At any Nash equilibrium of this game, the belief p t is a bounded martingale with respect to the …ltration fH 2t g t and measure P . It therefore converges P -almost surely (and henceP -andP -almost surely) to a random variable p 1 de…ned on . Furthermore, at any equilibrium the posterior p t is aP -submartingale and aP -supermartingale with respect to the …ltration fH 2t g t .
Uninformed Player is Short-Lived
When player 2 is short-lived, and we are interested in the lower bounds on player 1's ex ante payo¤s that arise from the existence of "Stackelberg" commitment types (as in Fudenberg and Levine (1992) ), it su¢ ces to consider commitment types who follow "simple"strategies. Consequently, when player 2 is short-lived, we assume^ 1 speci…es the same (possibly mixed) action & 1 2 I in each period independent of history (cf. De…nition 4 below).
If & 1 is part of a stage-game equilibrium, reputations need not disappearwe need only consider an equilibrium in which the normal and commitment type both player & 1 , and player 2 plays his part of the corresponding equilibrium. We are interested in commitment types who play a strategy that is not part of a stage-game equilibrium: 3 Assumption 4 (Non-Credible Commitment) Player 2 has a unique best reply to
is not a stage-game Nash equilibrium.
Since & 2 is the unique best response to & 1 , & 2 is pure and BR S (^ 1 ) is the singleton f^ 2 g, where^ 2 is the strategy of playing & 2 in every period. Assumption 4 implies that (^ 1 ;^ 2 ) is not a Nash equilibrium of the completeinformation in…nite horizon game.
De…nition 3 A Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game with short-lived uninformed players is a strategy pro…le (~ 1 ; 2 ) such that for all 0 1 , j 2 J and t = 0; 1; :::,
Our main result, for short-lived uninformed players, is that reputations for non-equilibrium behavior are temporary:
Theorem 1 Suppose the monitoring distribution satis…es Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 and the commitment action & 1 satis…es Assumption 4. In any Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game with short-lived uninformed players, p t ! 0P -almost surely.
Uninformed Player is Long-Lived
When player 2 is long-lived, non-simple Stackelberg types may give rise to higher lower bounds on player 1's payo¤ than do simple types. We accordingly introduce a richer set of possible commitment types, allowing arbitrary public strategies.
De…nition 4 (1) A behavior strategy `,`= 1; 2, is public if it is measurable with respect to the …ltration induced by the public signals, fH t g t .
(2) A behavior strategy `,`= 1; 2, is simple if it is a constant function.
A public strategy induces a mixture over actions in each period that only depends on public histories. Any pure strategy is realization equivalent to a public strategy. Simple strategies, which we associated with the commitment type in Section 3.1, play the same mixture over stage-game actions in each period, and hence are trivially public.
Allowing the commitment type to play any public strategy necessitates imposing the noncredibility requirement directly on the in…nitely repeated game of complete information. Mimicking Assumption 4, we require that (i ) player 2's best response^ 2 be unique on the equilibrium path and (ii ) there exists a …nite time T o such that, for every t > T o , a normal player 1 would almost surely want to deviate from^ 1 , given player 2's best response. That is, there is a period-t continuation strategy for player 1 that strictly increases her utility. A strategy^ 1 satisfying these criteria at least eventually loses its credibility, and hence is said to have "no long-run credibility."
De…nition 5 The strategy^ 1 has no long-run credibility if there exists
implies that with P (^ 1 ;^ 2 ) -probability one,^ 2t is pure and
for all 0 2 attaching probability zero to the action played by^ 2t (h 2t ) after
This de…nition captures the two main features of Assumption 4, a unique best response and absence of equilibrium, in a dynamic setting. In particular, the stage-game action of any simple strategy satisfying De…nition 5 satis…es Assumption 4. In assuming the best response is unique, we need to avoid the possibility that there are multiple best responses to the commitment action "in the limit" (as t gets large). We do so by imposing a uniformity condition in De…nition 5.1, that inferior responses reduce payo¤s by at least " o . 4 The condition on the absence of equilibrium in De…nition 4 Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) show that reputations disappear when the commitment strategy satis…es the second, but not necessarily the …rst, condition (such a strategy was said to be never an equilibrium strategy in the long run). However, that result also requires the commitment strategy to be implementable by a …nite automaton, and more problematically, the result itself imposed a condition on the behavior of player 2 in the equilibrium of the game with incomplete information. We do neither here. Consequently, unlike our earlier paper, the long-lived player result implies the result for short-lived players.
5.2 similarly ensures that for all large t, player 1 can strictly improve on the commitment action. Again it is necessary to impose uniformity to avoid the possibility of an equilibrium in the limit.
Any^ 1 that does not satisfy De…nition 5 must have (at least in the limit) periods and histories where, given player 2 is best responding to^ 1 , player 1 prefers to stick to her commitment. In other words,^ 1 is a credible commitment, in the limit, at least some of the time.
Equilibrium when the uninformed player is long-lived is:
De…nition 6 A Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game with a long-lived uninformed player is a strategy pro…le (~ 1 ; 2 ) such that,
Our result for games where player 2 is long-lived, which implies Theorem 1, is:
Theorem 2 Suppose satis…es Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, and that the commitment type's strategy^ 1 is public and has no long run credibility. Then in any Nash equilibrium of the game with incomplete information, p t ! 0 P -almost surely.
Asymptotic Equilibrium Play
The impermanence of reputations has implications for behavior as well as beliefs. In the limit, the normal type of player 1 and player 2 play a correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game. Hence, di¤erences in the players' beliefs about how play will continue vanish in the limit. This is stronger than the convergence to subjective equilibria obtained by Kalai and Lehrer (1995, Corollary 4.4 .1), 5 though with stronger assumptions.
We present the result for the case of a long-run player 2, since only straightforward modi…cations are required (imposing the appropriate optimality conditions period-by-period) to address short-run player 2's. To begin, we describe some notation for the correlated equilibrium of the repeated game with imperfect monitoring. We use the term period -t continua-tion game for the game with initial period in period t. 6 We use the notation t 0 = 0; 1; 2; ::: for a period of play in a continuation game (which may be the original game) and t for the time elapsed prior to the start of the period-t continuation game. A pure strategy for player 1, s 1 , is a sequence of maps s 1t 0 : H 1t 0 ! I for t 0 = 0; 1; : : :. 7 Thus, s 1t 0 2 I H 1t 0 and s 1 2 I [ t 0 H 1t 0 S 1 , and similarly s 2 2 S 2 J [ t 0 H 2t 0 . The spaces S 1 and S 2 are countable products of …nite sets. We equip the product space S S 1 S 2 with the -algebra generated by the cylinder sets, denoted by S. Denote the players' payo¤s in the in…nitely repeated game (as a function of these pure strategies) as follows
and
The expectation above is taken over the action pairs (i t 0 ; j t 0 ). These are random, given the pure strategy pro…le (s 1 ; s 2 ), because the pure action played in period t depends upon the random public signals.
We follow Hart and Schmeidler (1989) in using the ex ante de…nition of correlated equilibria for in…nite pure-strategy sets:
De…nition 7 A correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game is a measure on (S; S) such that for all S-measurable functions 1 :
Let M denote the space of probability measures on (S; S), equipped with the product topology. Then, a sequence n converges to if, for each 0, we have
Moreover, M is sequentially compact with this topology. Payo¤s for players 1 and 2 are extended to M in the obvious way. Since payo¤s are discounted, the product topology is strong enough to guarantee continuity of u`: M !R. The set of mixed strategies for player`is denoted by M`. Fix an equilibrium of the incomplete-information game with imperfect monitoring. When player 1 is the normal (respectively, commitment) type, the monitoring technology and the behavior strategies (~ 1 ; 2 ) (resp., (^ 1 ; 2 )) induce a probability measure~ t (resp.,^ t ) on the t-period histories (h 1t ; h 2t ) 2 H 1t H 2t . If the normal type of player 1 observes a private history h 1t 2 H 1t , her strategy,~ 1 , speci…es a behavior strategy in the period-t continuation game. This behavior strategy is realization equivalent to a mixed strategy~ h 1t 2 M 1 for the period-t continuation game. Similarly, the commitment type will play a mixed strategy^ h 1t 2 M 1 for the continuation game and player 2 will form his posterior p t (h 2t ) and play the mixed strategy h 2t 2 M 2 in the continuation game. Conditional on player 1 being normal, the composition of the probability measure~ t and the measures (~ h 1t ; h 2t ) induces a joint probability measure,~ t , on the pure strategies in the continuation game and player 2's posterior (the space S [0; 1]). Similarly, conditional upon player 1 being the commitment type, there is a measurê t on S [0; 1]. Let~ t denote the marginal of~ t on S and^ t denote the marginal of^ t on S.
At the …xed equilibrium, the normal type is playing in an optimal way from time t onwards given her available information. This implies that for all S-measurable functions 1 :
Let S B denote the product -algebra on S [0; 1] generated by S on S and the Borel -algebra on [0; 1]. Player 2 is also playing optimally from time t onwards, which implies that for all S B-measurable functions 2 :
(5) If we had metrized M, a natural formalization of the idea that asymptotically, the normal type and player 2 are playing a correlated equilibrium is that the distance between the set of correlated equilibria and the induced equilibrium distributions~ t on S goes to zero. While M is metrizable, a simpler and equivalent formulation is that the limit of every convergent subsequence of f~ t g is a correlated equilibrium. This equivalence is an implication of the fact that M is sequentially compact, and hence every subsequence of f~ t g has a convergent sub-subsequence. The proof of the following is in the Appendix:
Theorem 3 Fix a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game and suppose p t ! 0P -almost surely. Let~ t denote the distribution on S induced in period t by the Nash equilibrium. The limit of every convergent subsequence of f~ t g is a correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game.
Since players have access to a coordination device, namely histories, in general it is not true that Nash equilibrium play of the incompleteinformation game eventually looks like Nash equilibrium play of the completeinformation game. 8 Suppose the Stackelberg payo¤ is not a correlated equilibrium payo¤ of the complete-information game. Recall that Fudenberg and Levine (1992) provide a lower bound on equilibrium payo¤s in the incomplete-information game (with short-run players) of the following type: Fix the prior probability of the Stackelberg (commitment) type. Then, there is a value for the discount factor, , such that if 1 > , then in every Nash equilibrium, the long-lived player's ex ante payo¤ is essentially no less than the Stackelberg payo¤. The reconciliation of this result with Theorem 3 lies in the order of quanti…ers: while Fudenberg and Levine (1992) …x the prior, p 0 , and then select (p 0 ) large (with (p 0 ) ! 1 as p 0 ! 0), we …x 1 and examine asymptotic play, so that eventually p t is su¢ ciently small that 1 < (p t ).
Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
The short-lived uninformed player case is a special case of the long-lived player case. However, the proof for the long-lived uninformed player is quite complicated, while the short-lived player case illustrates many of the issues in a simpler setting. In what follows, references to the incomplete 8 We do not know if Nash equilibrium play in the incomplete-information game eventually looks like a public randomization over Nash equilibrium play in the completeinformation game. As far as we are aware, it is also not known whether the result of Fudenberg and Levine (1994, Theorem 6 .1, part (iii)) extends to correlated equilibrium. That is, for moral hazard mixing games and for large , is it true that the long-run player's maximum correlated equilibrium payo¤ is lower than when monitoring is perfect? information game without further quali…cation refer to the game with the long-lived uninformed player, and so the discussion also covers short-lived uninformed players (where^ 1 (h s ) = & 1 for all h s ). Whenever it is helpful, however, we also give informative simpler arguments for the case of shortlived uninformed players.
The basic strategy of our proof is to show that if player 2 is not eventually convinced that player 1 is normal, then he must be convinced that player 1 is playing like the commitment type (Lemma 1) and hence player 2 plays a best response to the latter. Our earlier paper proceeded by arguing that the normal type then has an incentive to deviate from the commitment strategy (since the latter has no long-run credibility), which forms the basis for a contradiction (with player 2's belief that the two types of player 1 are playing identically). The di¢ culty in applying this argument in our current setting is that player 1 needs to know player 2's private history h 2t in order to predict 2's period-t beliefs and hence behavior. Unfortunately, player 1 knows only her own private history h 1t . Our argument thus requires showing that player 1 eventually "almost" knows the relevant features of player 2's history.
Player 2' s Posterior Beliefs
The …rst step is to show that either player 2's expectation (given his private history) of the strategy played by the normal type is, in the limit, identical to his expectation of the strategy played by the commitment type, or player 2's posterior probability that player 1 is the commitment type converges to zero (given that player 1 is indeed normal). This is an extension of a familiar merging-style argument to the case of imperfect monitoring. If, for a given private history for player 2, the distributions generating his observations are di¤erent for the normal and commitment types, then he will be updating his posterior, continuing to do so as the posterior approaches zero. His posterior converges to something strictly positive only if the distributions generating these observations are in the limit identical for each private history.
The proof of Lemma 1 in Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) applies to the current setting without change:
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satis…ed and^ 1 is public. In any Nash equilibrium of the game with incomplete information, 9
Condition (6) says that almost surely either player 2's best prediction of the normal type's behavior at the current stage is arbitrarily close to his best prediction of the commitment type's behavior (that is, k^ 1t Ẽ [~ 1t j H 2t ] k ! 0), or the type is revealed (that is, p t (1 p t ) ! 0). However, lim p t < 1P -almost surely, and hence (6) implies a simple corollary:
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satis…ed and^ 1 is public. In any Nash equilibrium of the game with incomplete information,
Player 2' s Beliefs about his Future Behavior
We now examine the consequences of the existence of aP -positive measure set of states on which reputations do not disappear, i.e., lim t!1 p t (!) > 0. The normal and the commitment types eventually play the same strategy on these states (Lemma 1). Consequently, we can show that on a positive probability subset of these states, player 2 eventually attaches high probability to the event that in all future periods he will play a best response to the commitment type.
As^ 1 is public, player 2 has a best response to^ 1 that is also public. Moreover, this best response is unique on the equilibrium path for all t > T o (by De…nition 5). We let j (h t ) denote the action that is the pure best-response after the public history h t , for all t > T o . Note that j (h t ) is H t -measurable. The event that player 2 plays a best response to the commitment strategy in all periods after t > T o is then de…ned as
(h 2s (!)) = 1; 8s t g; where h s (!) (respectively, h 2s (!)) is the s-period public (resp., 2's private) history of !.
When the uninformed players are short-lived,^ 1 is simple and player 2 has a unique best reply, BR S (& 1 ) = f& 2 g, so
With this in hand we can show that if player 2 does not eventually learn that player 1 is normal, then he eventually attaches high probability to thereafter playing a best response to the commitment type:
Lemma 2 Suppose the hypotheses of Theorem 2 hold, 10 and suppose there is a Nash equilibrium in which reputations do not necessarily disappear, i.e., P (A) > 0, where A fp t 9 0g. There exists > 0 and F A, with P (F ) > 0, such that, for any > 0, there exists T for which, on F ,
Proof. SinceP (A) > 0 and p t converges almost surely, there exists 
The H 2t -measurable event A t approximates D (because player 2 knows his own beliefs, the random variables d t j1 D 1 At j convergeP -almost surely to zero). Hence
where the …rst and third lines use Z t 1 and the second uses the measurability of A t with respect to H 2t . All the terms on the last line convergẽ P -almost surely to zero, and soẼ[Z t jH 2t ] ! 0P -a.s. on the set D. Egorov's Theorem (Chung (1974, p. 74) ) then implies that there exists F D such thatP (F ) > 0 on which the convergence of p t andẼ[Z t jH 2t ] is uniform.
To clarify the remainder of the argument, we present here the case of short-lived player 2 (long-lived player 2 is discussed in Appendix A.2). This case is particularly simple, because if player 2 believed his opponent was "almost" the commitment type, then in each period 2 plays the same equilibrium action as if he was certain he was facing the commitment simple type.
From the upper semi-continuity of the best response correspondence, there exists > 0 such that for any history h 1s and any 1 2 I satisfying k 1 & 1 k , a best response to 1 is also a best response to & 1 , and so necessarily equals & 2 . The uniform convergence ofẼ[Z t jH 2t ] on F implies that, for any > 0, there exists a time T such that on F , for all t > T , p t > and (since^ 1s = & 1 )
AsẼ[Z t jH 2t ] < for all t > T on F and Z t 0,P (fZ t > gjH 2t ) < for all t > T on F , implying (7).
Player 1' s Beliefs about Player 2' s Future Behavior
Our next step is to show, with positive probability, player 1 eventually expects player 2 to play a best response to the commitment type for the remainder of the game. We …rst show that, while player 2's private history h 2t is typically of use to player 1 in predicting 2's period-s behavior for s > t, this usefullness vanishes as s ! 1. The intuition is straightforward. If period-s behavior is eventually (as s becomes large) independent of h 2t , then clearly h 2t is eventually of no use in predicting that behavior. Suppose then that h 2t is essential to predicting player 2's behavior in all periods s > t. Then, player 1 continues to receive information about this history from subsequent observations, reducing the value of having h 2t explicitly revealed. As time passes player 1 will …gure out whether h 2t actually occurred from her own observations, again reducing the value of independently knowing h 2t .
Denote by (A; B) the smallest -algebra containing the -algebras A and B: Thus, (H 1s ; H 2t ) is the -algebra describing player 1's information at time s if she were to learn the private history of player 2 at time t. Proof. We prove the result here for = 0. The case of 1 is proved by induction in Appendix A.3. Suppose K J t is a set of t-period player 2 action pro…les (j 0 ; j 1 ; :::; j t 1 ). We also denote by K the corresponding event (i.e., subset of ). By Bayes'rule and the …niteness of the action and signal spaces, we can write the conditional probability of the event K given the observation by player 1 of h 1;s+1 = (h 1s ; y s ; i s ) as follows ] is player 1's conditional probability of observing the period-s signal y s given she takes action i s and hence is strictly positive and less than one by Assumption 1. Thus,
Since the sequence of random variables fP [KjH 1s ]g s is a martingale relative to (fH 1s g s ;P ), it convergesP -almost surely to a non-negative limit P [KjH 11 ] as s ! 1. Consequently, the left side of this inequality convergesP -almost surely to zero. The signals generated by player 2's actions satisfy Assumption 3, so an identical argument to that given at the end of the proof of Lemma 1 in Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) giving the result for = 0.
Now we apply Lemma 3 to a particular piece of information player 2 could have at time t. By Lemma 2, with positive probability, we reach a time t at which player 2 assigns high probability to the event that all his future behavior is a best reply to the commitment type. Intuitively, by Lemma 3, these period-t beliefs of player 2 about his own future behavior will, eventually, become known to player 1. This step is motivated by the observation that, if player 1 eventually expects player 2 to always play a best response to the commitment type, then the normal type of player 1 will choose to deviate from the behavior of the commitment type (which is not a best response to player 2's best response to the commitment type). At this point, we appear to have a contradiction between player 2's belief on the event F (from Lemma 2) that the normal and commitment types are playing identically and player 1's behavior on the event F y (the event where player 1 expects player 2 to always play a best response to the commitment type, identi…ed in the next lemma). This contradiction would be immediate if F y was both a subset of F and measurable for player 2. Unfortunately we have no reason to expect either. However, the next lemma shows that F y is in fact close to a H 2s -measurable set on which player 2's beliefs that player 1 is the commitment type do not converge to zero. In this case we will (eventually) have a contradiction: On all such histories, the normal and commitment types are playing identically. However, nearly everywhere on a relatively large subset of these states, player 1 is deviating from the commitment strategy in an identi…able way.
Recall that j (h s ) is the action played for sure in period s after the public history h s by player 2's best response to the commitment type. Hence, E[ j (h s 0 ) 2s 0 jH 1s ] is the probability player 1 assigns in period s to the event that 2 best responds to the commitment type in period s 0 s. For the case of the short-lived uninformed players and the simple commitment type, j (h s ) = & 2 for all h s , 11 and so
Lemma 4 Suppose the hypotheses of Theorem 2 hold, and suppose there is a Nash equilibrium in which reputations do not necessarily disappear, i.e., P (fp t 9 0g) > 0. Let > 0 be the constant and F the positive probability event identi…ed in Lemma 2. For any > 0 and number of periods > 0, there exists an event F y and a time T ( ; ) such that for all s > T ( ; ) there exists C y s 2 H 2s with:
and for any s 0 2 fs; s + 1; :::; s + g, on F y ,
Proof. Fix 2 (0; 1) and a number of periods > 0. Fix < ( 1 4 P (F )) 2 , and let T denote the critical period identi…ed in Lemma 2 for this value of .
Player 1's minimum estimated probability on j (h s 0 ) over periods s; : : : ; s+ can be written as f s min s s 0 s+ Ẽ [
jH 1s ]. Notice that f s > 1 is a su¢ cient condition for inequality (11).
The …rst part of the proof is to …nd a lower bound for f s . For any t s, the triangle inequality implies
jH 1s ]j for t s. By Lemma 3, lim s!1 k t s = 0P -almost surely. As j (h s 0 ) 2s 0 1 and is equal to 1 on G o t , the above implies
Moreover, the sequence of random variables fP (G o t j (H 1s ; H 2t ))g s is a martingale with respect to the …ltration fH 1s g s , and so converges almost surely to a limit, g t P (G o t j (H 11 ; H 2t )). Hence
where`t s jg t P (G o t j (H 1s ; H 2t ))j and lim s!1`t s = 0P -almost surely. The second step of the proof determines the sets C y s and a set that we will use to later determine F y . For any t T , de…ne
Let F s t denote the event \ s =t K and set (9) holds with F in the role of F y . By de…nition,
where we use bars to denote complements. By our choice of C y s , the event C y s \ N T is a subset of the event K T \ N T . Thus, we have the bound
We now …nd upper bounds for the two terms on the right side of (13). First notice thatP (C
Also, asP (G o t jK t ) > 1 and K t 2 H 2t , the properties of iterated expectations imply that 1
The extremes of the above inequality imply thatP ( N t jK t ) < p . Hence, taking t = T we getP
Using (14) and (15) in (13),P (C y s ) P (F ) < 2 p for all s T 0 . Given F C y s , the bound on , and < 1, it follows that
Finally, we combine the two steps above to obtain F y . AsP (F ) > 0 and k T s +`T s converges almost surely to zero, by Egorov's Theorem, there exists F y F such thatP (F n F y ) < p and a time T 00 > T such that
Hence on F y , by (12), f s > 1 2 p for all s > T ( ; ). This, and the bound on , implies (11). Moreover, asP (F nF y ) < p andP (C y s ) P (F ) < 2 p , (10) holds for all s > T ( ; ).
When player 2 is long-lived, it will be convenient to know that the conclusions of Lemma 4 hold on a sequence of cylinder sets:
Corollary 2 Assume the conditions of Lemma 4. De…ne F
s . Then, (9), (10), and (11) 
Toward a Contradiction
We have shown that when reputations do not necessarily disappear, there exists a set F y on which (11) holds and F y C y s 2 H 2s . The remaining argument is more transparent in the setting of the short-lived player 2s of Theorem 1. Accordingly, we …rst prove Theorem 1, and then give the distinct argument needed when player 2 is long-lived and the commitment strategy is not simple.
In broad brushstrokes, the argument proving Theorem 1 is as follows. First, we conclude that on F y , the normal type will not be playing the commitment strategy. To be precise-on F y there will exist a stage-game action played by & 1 but not by the normal type. This will bias player 2's expectation of the normal type's actions away from the commitment strategy on C y s , because there is little probability weight on C y s n F y . We then get a contradiction, because the fact that p s > on C y s implies player 2 must believe the commitment type's strategy and the normal type's average strategy are the same on C y s . The argument proving Theorem 2 must deal with the nonstationary nature of the commitment strategy (and the nonstationary nature of the failure of credibility). As in the simple case, we have found a set of states F y where, for all s su¢ ciently large, the normal type attaches high probability to player 2 best responding to the commitment type for the next periods. The normal type's best response to this is not the commitment strategy, and hence the normal type does not play the commitment strategy. We will derive a contradiction by showing that player 2 almost comes to know this.
The complication is that it may be very di¢ cult for player 2 to predict just how the normal type's strategy deviates from the commitment strategy. When working with the stationary commitment strategy of Theorem 1, we can be certain there is a stage-game action played by the commitment type which the normal type's strategy would (eventually) not play after any private history. In the setting of Theorem 2, however, the normal type's deviation from the nonstationary commitment strategy may be much more complicated, and may depend on private (rather than just public) information.
Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose, en route to the contradiction, that there is a Nash equilibrium in which reputations do not necessarily disappear. ThenP (fp t 9 0g) > 0.
, that is, & 1 is the smallest non-zero probability attached to an action under the commitment strategy & 1 . Since (& 1 ; & 2 ) is not a Nash equilibrium, & 1 plays an action that is suboptimal by at least > 0 when player 2 uses any strategy su¢ ciently close to & 2 . That is, there exists > 0, i 0 2 I with & i 0 1 > 0 and > 0 such that
Finally, for a given discount factor 1 < 1 there exists a su¢ ciently large such that the loss of for one period is larger than any feasible potential gain deferred by periods: (1 1 ) > 1 2 max ij j 1 (i; j)j. Fix the event F from Lemma 2. For < minf ; 1 2 & 1 g and above, let F y and, for s > T ( ; ), C y s be the events described in Lemma 4. Now consider the normal type of player 1 in period s > T ( ; ) at some state in F y . By (11), she expects player 2 to play within < of & 2 for the next periods. Playing the action i 0 is conditionally dominated in period s, since the most she can get from playing i 0 in period s is worse than playing a best response to & 2 for periods and then being minmaxed. Thus, on F y the normal type plays action i 0 with probability zero: i 0 1s = 0. Now we calculate a lower bound on the di¤erence between player 2's beliefs about the normal type's probability of playing action i 0 in period s, E[ i 0 1s jH 2s ], and the probability the commitment type plays action i 0 on the set of states C y s : This concludes the proof of Theorem 1, since we now have a contradiction withP (F ) > 0 (from Lemma 2) and (16), which holds for all s > T ( ; ).
Proof of Theorem 2
We …rst argue that, after any su¢ ciently long public history, there is one continuation public history after which the commitment type will play some action i o 2 I with positive probability, but after which the normal type will choose not to play i o , regardless of her private history. To …nd such a history, notice that^ 2 (player 2's best response to the commitment strategy) is pure and therefore public, ensuring that the normal player 1 has a public best response to^ 2 and that it is not^ 1 . Hence, there exists a public history where 1's public best response di¤ers from the commitment strategy, for all private histories consistent with this public history. If we can show this preference is strict, this will still hold when player 2 is just playing close to a best response, which will open the door to a contradiction. The formal statement is (the proof is in Appendix A.4):
Lemma 5 Suppose^ 1 is a public strategy with no long-run credibility (with an associated T o ), and^ 2 is player 2's public best reply. Then, player 1 has a public best reply, 
For s > T o , Lemma 5 describes how player 1's best response to^ 2 di¤ers from^ 1 . In the game with incomplete information, Lemma 5 de…nes three H s -measurable functions, i( ; s) : ! I, s 0 ( ; s) : ! ft : s t s + g, and h( ; s) : ! [ 1 t=0 Y t as follows: Associated with each state ! 2 is the implied s-period public history, h s . The action-period pair (i(!; s); s 0 (!; s)) is the action-period pair (i o ; s 0 ) from Lemma 5 for the public history h s . Finally, h(!; s) is the s 0 (!; s)-period continuation history h o s 0 of h s from Lemma 5. We emphasize that h(!; s) is typically not the s 0 (!; s)-period public history of ! (for a start, it is H s -measurable); while the …rst s-periods of h(!; s) are the s-period public history of !, the next s 0 (!; s) s periods describe the public signals from Lemma 5.
With these functions in hand, we can describe how player 1's behavior di¤ers from that of the commitment type when she is su¢ ciently con…dent that player 2 is best responding to the commitment type (where min y;i;j y ij > 0 and is from Lemma 5; the proof is in Appendix A.5):
Lemma 6 Suppose the hypotheses of Theorem 2 hold, and suppose there is a Nash equilibrium in which reputations do not necessarily disappear, i.e., P (fp t 9 0g) > 0. Let^ , , and be the constants identi…ed in Lemma 5. Suppose >^ satis…es 12M 1 < , > 0 satis…es 12M < , and fF y s g s is the sequence of events identi…ed in Corollary 2. For all s T ( ; 2 ), To complete the argument then, suppose the assumptions of Lemma 6 (including the bounds on and ) hold, and in addition
The set of states consistent with 2's information at time s, C y s , and the "right" continuation public history, is C 
where the last equality follows from and so (19) is at least as large as
where the last equality is an implication ofẼ
Hence, from the chain from (18) to (20), we havẽ
Applying the bounds P (F ) >P (C (21) gives
The bound (17) ensures that (1 ) > =2, and hencẽ
Imperfect Private Monitoring
In this section, we brie ‡y sketch how our results can be extended to the case of private monitoring. Instead of observing a public signal y at the end of each period, player 1 observes a private signal (drawn from a …nite set ) and player 2 observes a private signal (drawn from a …nite set Z). A history for a player is the sequence of his or her actions and private signals. Given the underlying action pro…le (i; j), we let ij denote a probability distribution over Z. We use ij to denote the probability of the signal pro…le ( ; ) conditional on (i; j). The marginal distributions are ij = P ij and ij = P ij . The case of public monitoring is a special case: take = Z and 2 ij = 1 for all i, j.
We now describe the analogs of our earlier assumptions on the monitoring technology. The full-support assumption is:
Assumption 5 (Full Support) ij ; ij > 0 for all 2 , 2 Z, and all (i; j) 2 I J.
Note that we do not assume that ij > 0 for all (i; j) 2 I J and ( ; ) 2 2 (which would rule out public monitoring). Instead, the full-support assumption is that each signal is observed with positive probability under every action pro…le.
Assumption 6 (Identification 1) For all j 2 J, the I columns in the matrix ( ij ) 2Z;i2I are linearly independent.
Assumption 7 (Identification 2) For all i 2 I, the J columns in the matrix ( ij ) 2 ;j2J are linearly independent.
Even when monitoring is truly private, in the sense that ij > 0 for all (i; j) 2 I J and ( ; ) 2 Z, reputations can have very powerful shortrun e¤ects. This is established in Theorem 4, which is a minor extension of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) . 12 1 2 While Fudenberg and Levine (1992) explicitly assume public monitoring, under Assumption 6, their analysis also covers imperfect private monitoring. This includes games where player 1 observes no informative signal. In such a case, when there is complete information, the one-period-memory strategies that we describe as equilibria in Section 2 of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) are also equilibria of the game with private monitoring. We thank Juuso Välimäki for showing us how to construct such equilibria.
Again, becauseP (p t > ") < , (A.1) implies Z
Integrating out p t implies that, for all
Consider now a convergent subsequence, denoted~ t k with limit~ 1 , and suppose~ 1 is not a correlated equilibrium. Since (4) holds for all t 0 , it also holds in the limit. If~ 1 is not a correlated equilibrium, it must then be the case that for some
But then for t k su¢ ciently large,
contradicting (A.2) for su¢ ciently small.
A.2 Completion of the Proof of Lemma 2
Turning to the general case, let M max i2I;j2J;`2f1;2g j `( i; j)j, so that M is an upper bound on the magnitude of stage-game payo¤s. Let = " o =6M , where " o is given by De…nition 5. If Z t , player 2's expected continuation payo¤s at h 2s under the strategy pro…le (~ 1 ;^ 1 ; 2 ) are within 2M of his continuation payo¤ under the pro…le (^ 1 ;^ 1 ; 2 ). Hence, if Z t and history h 2s (for s t T o ) occurs with positive probability, then
for all 2 . We now show that if Z t for t T o , then player 2 plays the pure action j (h s ) in all future periods. Suppose instead that the equilibrium 2 plays j 6 = j (h s ) with positive probability in period s under a history h 2s . De…ne 0 2 to be identical to 2 except that, after the history h 2s , it places zero probability weight on the action j (h s ) and increases the probability of all other actions played by 2 by equal weight. Let^ 2 be player 2's best response to the commitment type. Then, if Z t we have 13
As 4M < " o ,^ 2 is a pro…table deviation after the history h 2s for player 2-a contradiction. Hence on the event Z t player 2 plays j (h s ) in all future periods. Equivalently, we have shown
A.3 Completion of the Proof of Lemma 3
The proof for 1 follows by induction. In particular, we have 
The left side of this inequality converges to zeroP -almost surely, and hence so does the right side. Moreover, applying the triangle inequality and rear-ranging, we …nd that the right side is larger than From the induction hypothesis that kẼ[ 2z j (H 1s ; H 2t )] Ẽ [ 2z jH 1s ]k converges to zeroP -almost surely for every z 2 fs; :::; s + 1g, the negative term also converges to zeroP -almost surely. But then the …rst term also converges to zero, and, as above, the result holds for z = s + .
A.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Since^ 1 is public, player 2 has a best reply^ 2 that is public, and so player 1 has a public best reply s, that are continuations of h s and s 0 is the …rst period in which there is an action in I receiving positive probability under^ 1 but receiving zero probability under y 1 . 14 Note that (h s ) is at most countable. In 1 4 Because y 1 is a best response to^ 2, there must exist such histories, since otherwise every action accorded positive probability by^ 1 would be optimal, contradicting (A.4). addition, there are no two elements of (h s ) with the property that one is a continuation of the other. For h s 0 2 (h s ), s 0 > s, in period s, every action that receives positive probability under strategy^ 1 also receives positive probability under y 1 , and so the comment after equation (A.4 and soQ ( (h s ;^ )jh s ) > q " o 6M " o (the denominator is positive, since De…nition 5 implies " o 2M ).
There are at most Y^ histories in (h s ;^ ). In the last period of each such history, there is an action i 2 I that is played with positive probability by^ 1 and zero probability by y 1 . Since there are at most I such actions, 1 5 It is possible that P h s 0 2 (hs)Q (h s 0 jhs) < 1. However, expected payo¤s under ( y 1 ;^ 2) and (^ 1;^ 2) are equal after any history not in (hs), and so such histories can then be omitted from (A.5).
there is a history h o s 0 (h s ) 2 (h s ;^ ) and action i o (h s ) such that, under (^ 1 ;^ 2 ), the probability that the history h o s 0 (h s ) occurs and is followed by action i o (h s ) is at least q=(IY^ ). Trivially, then,^ A.5 Proof of Lemma 6
We prove only the second and third assertions (the …rst being an immediate implication of Lemma 5 and the de…nitions of i, s 0 , and h).
Since ! 2 F y s and proj s (! 0 ) = proj s (!) implies ! 0 2 F y s , for any s-period public history consistent with a state in F y s , and any s 0 -period (s 0 > s) public continuation of that history, there is at least one state in F y s consistent with that continuation. Consequently, since every period public history has probability at least ,P (F z s ) P (F y s ) > (1 )P (F ) > 0. After any public history, the normal type's payo¤s under ( y 1 ;^ 2 ) are independent of her private histories-she is playing her public best response to a public strategy. At states in F z s , from Corollary 2, under~ 1 , player 1 expects player 2's future play (over the periods s; s+1; :::; s+2 ) to be within of his best response to the commitment strategy,^ 2 . Hence, on F z s , player 1 expects that player 2's future play (over the periods s; s+1; :::; s+2 ) to be within of his best response to the commitment strategy,^ 2 , irrespective of her play in those periods. Discounted to the period s 0 s + , payo¤s from periods after s + 2 can di¤er by at most 2M Hence, after the public history h(!; s), no private history for player 1 (consistent with F z s ) makes playing action i(!) pro…table.
